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Free to print: The Reading Checklist: Forty Questions for Any Public Merger Agreement, from How to Read a Public Company Merger Agreement.
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The forty questions in this chapter are the last thing to read before you advise a board, vote a block of shares or put on an arbitrage position. They do not replace reading the agreement. They make sure that, when you have finished reading it, you have answered the questions that decide who bears which risk and at what price.
Each question takes one line, followed by one sentence on why it matters. The questions follow the order of the book, so each group points back to the chapter that reads the clause in detail. The case of Tollan Holdings and Ormsby Instruments, with Corvane Industrial as the topping bidder, appears where it shows the point; the full timetable is in Chapter 11.
Use the list on any public merger agreement for a Delaware target. Some questions will have short answers. A question with no answer in the agreement is itself an answer: silence is a choice the parties made, and it usually favors one side.
The first seven questions fix what the target's stockholders receive and how the deal is built. Chapters 2 and 3 read these clauses.
Is the deal a one-step merger or a two-step tender offer followed by a merger?
Why: the structure sets the approval route, the timetable and which waiting periods apply (Chapter 2).
Which entity merges into which, and which one survives?
Why: the survivor inherits the target's contracts and liabilities, and the choice can affect consents under those contracts (Chapter 2).
What exactly does each target share receive: cash, buyer stock, or both, and in what proportion?
Why: the mix decides how much of the price moves with the buyer's share price (Chapter 3).
If there is stock, is the exchange ratio fixed, floating, or floating inside a collar?
Why: in the case, the collar kept the stock part at $21.00 only between $63.00 and $77.00 for Tollan's shares (Chapter 3).
What happens outside the collar band, and does either side have a walk-away right there?
Why: outside the band the value per share moves, and some agreements add a termination right at the extremes (Chapter 3).
How are options, restricted stock and other equity awards treated?
Why: the treatment of awards changes the fully diluted share count on which the price is paid (Chapter 3 lists it among the points to check).
Are appraisal rights available under Delaware law, and is there a condition tied to the level of appraisal demands?
Why: holders who demand appraisal ask the court for fair value instead of the deal price, and a buyer may want a cap on that exposure (Chapter 3).
These questions test what the target promised about its past and its conduct until closing. Chapters 4 and 5 read these clauses.
Do the representations survive the closing, and is there any indemnity at all?
Why: in a public deal they usually do not survive, so the closing conditions are the buyer's only protection (Chapter 4).
Which representations are treated as fundamental, and to what standard must they be true?
Why: fundamental representations such as capitalization usually carry a stricter bring-down test (Chapter 4).
Are the representations qualified by materiality, by knowledge, or by a disclosure schedule?
Why: each qualifier narrows what the buyer can rely on, and the disclosure schedule is often where the real exceptions live (Chapter 4).
What may the target not do between signing and closing without the buyer's consent?
Why: the interim covenants freeze the business the buyer is paying for (Chapter 5).
Is the buyer's consent to an exception "not to be unreasonably withheld", or entirely at its discretion?
Why: that phrase decides how much flexibility the target keeps to run its business (Chapter 5).
Is there an ordinary course covenant, and is it an obligation of result or of efforts?
Why: a flat obligation to operate in the ordinary course can be breached by events outside management's control (Chapter 5).
Does the target have an obligation to give the buyer access and information before closing?
Why: access lets the buyer watch for problems, such as the weak quarter in the case, before it must close.
These questions set how hard it is for a rival to take the deal away. Chapters 6 and 7 read these clauses.
Is there a go-shop, and if so, how long does it run and how is an excluded party defined?
Why: in the case, the go-shop ran 35 days and no bidder emerged during it (Chapter 6).
What are the exceptions to the no-shop, and what can the board do with an unsolicited proposal?
Why: the exceptions decide whether the board can even engage with a rival (Chapter 6).
How is a superior proposal defined, including the ownership threshold and the factors the board must weigh?
Why: in the case, Corvane's $46.00 cash proposal had to pass that definition before the board could act (Chapter 7).
How long is the match right, and how much time does each amendment of a rival bid restart?
Why: in the case, the match right ran 4 business days, then 2 for each later amendment (Chapter 7).
When may the board change its recommendation, and is there an intervening event out?
Why: the change of recommendation clause defines the board's room under its fiduciary duties (Chapter 7).
What is the target termination fee, and is there a lower fee for a go-shop bidder?
Why: in the case, the fee was $75.6 million, or $1.26 per share, with $37.8 million for a go-shop bidder (Chapter 7).
What triggers the fee, and how long is the tail after a neutral termination?
Why: the tail stops a target from letting a deal die and selling to the rival without paying (Chapter 7).
Has any large holder signed a voting or support agreement, and does it fall away on a change of recommendation?
Why: in the case, no holder signed one, so the match right and the fee carried all of Tollan's protection (Chapter 7).
These questions test what bad news lets the buyer walk. Chapter 8 reads these clauses.
What does the MAE definition cover: business, results, financial condition, and prospects?
Why: each word added or removed changes what kind of harm counts (Chapter 8).
Does the definition include a branch for effects that would prevent or delay the closing?
Why: that branch protects the buyer against a target that cannot close, whatever its earnings (Chapter 8).
Which carve-outs are listed, and which carry a disproportionate effect exception?
Why: in the case, industry-wide and general economic changes were excluded unless they hit Ormsby disproportionately (Chapter 8).
Is the MAE a standalone condition, part of the bring-down, or both?
Why: the placement decides how the MAE test operates at closing (Chapters 8 and 9).
What do the target's latest results show against the words of the definition, not against any rule of thumb?
Why: in the case, quarterly EBITDA fell 18.0 percent and full-year EBITDA 9.7 percent, and Tollan did not claim an MAE (Chapter 8).
These questions test when each side must close and what happens if one will not. Chapter 9 reads these clauses.
Which conditions are mutual, which protect only the buyer, and which protect only the target?
Why: the sorting decides who can refuse to close and on what ground (Chapter 9).
Is there a financing condition, or must the buyer close whatever its lenders do?
Why: in the case there was none, and Tollan had to fund its $1,260.0 million cash part in every scenario (Chapter 9).
What financing commitments exist, and what must the buyer do if they fall away?
Why: the alternative financing covenant decides how much financing risk the target bears (Chapter 9).
What must the target do to cooperate with the buyer's financing, and at whose cost?
Why: a broad cooperation covenant can become a buyer's argument that the target caused a financing failure (Chapter 9).
What is the reverse termination fee, and what exactly triggers it?
Why: in the case, Tollan owed $151.2 million if the deal failed for antitrust reasons or for its financing (Chapter 9).
Is the reverse termination fee the target's sole and exclusive remedy, and does that reach willful breach?
Why: if it does, the fee can work like a price for the buyer to walk away (Chapter 9).
Can the target obtain specific performance to force the buyer to close, and on what conditions?
Why: that right decides whether the target's real remedy is a closing or only a fee (Chapter 9).
These questions set how long the target is bound and who carries the antitrust risk. Chapter 10 reads these clauses.
Which filings are required, including under the HSR Act, and by when must they be made?
Why: in the case, both parties filed in week 2 and a second request followed in week 6 (Chapter 10).
What standard of efforts does the buyer owe: reasonable best efforts, a burden cap, or hell or high water?
Why: in the case, Tollan accepted divestitures up to $120.0 million of annual revenue, a burden cap (Chapter 10).
How is the burden cap measured, and are several remedies added together?
Why: the measurement decides whether a remedy like the case's $45.0 million divestiture falls inside or outside the cap (Chapter 10).
Who controls strategy with the agencies, and must the buyer litigate against a challenge?
Why: control of strategy is control of timing, and silence on litigation is a frequent source of disputes (Chapter 10).
When is the outside date, and how and when is it extended?
Why: in the case, the outside date was 52 weeks, extended automatically by 13 weeks if only antitrust clearance was missing (Chapter 10).
Who loses the right to terminate at the outside date because its own breach caused the delay?
Why: that exception stops a party from running out the clock and then walking away (Chapter 10).
Key Takeaway: Forty questions, in six groups, cover structure, representations, deal protection, the MAE, conditions and remedies, and regulatory timing. In the case, the answers would have shown the $42.00 price with its collar, the $75.6 million and $151.2 million fees, the $120.0 million burden cap and the 52-week outside date on the day of signing. A question the agreement leaves unanswered is itself an answer.